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I. ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This case is more simple than appellee, Mr. Lether, conveys in his brief. The 
Court need only decide whether or not the trial judge should have considered parole 
evidence in determining 1) whether the provisions relating to the payment of the rent in 
connection with alimony are ambiguous; 2) after considering all of the evidence 
presented and all inferences in a light most favorable to Mrs. Lether, there was any 
genume issue of material fact and whether Mr. Lether is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, 3) whether the trial court properly dismissed Mrs. Letherfs petition seeking to 
revisit the property settlement of the marital estate based upon fraud and deception by 
Mr. Lether in the valuation of property and, 4) whether this appeal is frivolous such that 
Mr. Lether should be awarded his attorney's fees of defending against the appeal. 
Appellee, Mr. Lether, raises the following points in his appeal brief: 
1. Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of her appeal. 
2. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the 
parties and incorporated Into the Decree of Divorce is unambiguous. It is a final 
and complete expression of their agreement settling their marital affairs. 
3. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing 
Mrs. Lether's Petition for Clarification And/Or Modification of the Decree. 
4. Mr. Lether should be awarded his attorney's fees for this appeal. 
Mr. Lether argues that die trial judge's grant of summary judgment is reviewed 
1 
for an abuse of discretion reversing factual findings only if clearly erroneous and 
according the trial judge no discretion in his application of the law, but reviewing it for 
correctness only. The Court's exercise of discretion is not applicable in this case. The 
trial court must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Only after it has completed this 
process may summary judgment may be granted if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dixon v. Pro 
Image, Inc., 1999 UT 0042182, 378 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 1999); accord, Pasquin v. 
Pasquin, 999 UT 0042186 376 Utah Adv Rep. 19, 20 (Utah App. 1999); Hall V. NACM 
Intermountan, Inc., et. al, 1999 UT 0042199, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah 1999); 
Salt Lake County Commission, et. al. V. Short, 985 P.2d 899, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 
(Utah 1999): Timm, et al. v. Dewsnup. et. al., 1999 UT 0042227, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19, 22 (Utah 1999) (directed verdict) 
In none of the foregoing cases does the appellate court apply any abuse of 
discretion standard of review. Nor do any of them enunciate a requirement to marshal all 
of the evidence. Further, where, as below in the instant case, there has been no 
evidentiary hearing and the issues are presented on the record only, the Court of Appeals 
is as competent to determine issues of fact as is the trial court. 
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B. MRS. LETHER HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ENABLE 
THE COURT TO MAKE A DETERMINATION OF THE 
ISSUES IN THIS CASE 
Mr. Lether argues that Mrs Lether has failed to marshal the evidence and that the 
Court should not consider her appeal citing Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338 (Utah 1999), 
Moon v. Moon, 979 P.2d 338 (Utah App. 1999). To the contrary Mrs. Lether presented 
either all of the relevant evidence available or at least sufficient for this Court to make a 
determination of the issues in this appeal. 
Whether the marshaling of all of the evidence is applicable in a summary 
judgment proceeding is questionable. The cases cited by Mr. Lether are cases involving 
the appeal of a judgment after trial; not of an appeal of summary judgment from the 
record where the appellate court is as competent to determine factual issues from the 
record as was the trial court. In a summary judgment case the standard of review is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
Mrs. Lether here, there are no genuine disputes as to any material issue of fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is clear from the evidence 
which Mrs. Lether presents and argues on appeal that there are genuinely disputed issues 
of material fact and it cannot be determined that Mr. Lether is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law at this stage. He has attempted to confuse the issues and apply other 
standards not applicable to summary judgments. Not one of the cases on summary 
judgment cited by Mrs. Lether in the previous section mentions the need to marshal all 
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of the evidence. All deal directly with the issue of summary judgment on an analysis of 
whether there is a disputed triable issue of fact and whether the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
In Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 565, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1999) the trial court 
granted the defendant summary judgment dismissing the action after the trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "We find that Boice presented sufficient evidence to create a 
triable issue of fact and reverse." In the instant case the trail judge declined to take 
evidence, the affidavits with reports of medical doctors and one affidavit by a medical 
doctor notwithstanding. The information presented by Mrs. Lether is sufficient to create 
one or more triable issue of fact. Mr. Lether and the trial court are trying to resolve the 
whole matter on sufficiency of the evidence to support factual findings when there are 
genuinely disputed issues of fact. This flies in the face of Rule 56 and the whole 
purpose underlying summary judgment. Mr. Lether has cited no summary judgment 
cases in which an appellate court has refused to overturn a summary judgment because 
of failing to marshal every shred of evidence. Even the Moon case cited by Mr. Lether 
was a tried as a plenary action before the Court dismissed it. Mrs. Lether has not failed 
to marshal sufficient evidence for the court to consider her appeal of the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
ALIMONY PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE WERE AMBIGUOUS. 
In ruling on the issue of whether the alimony provisions of the Decree were 
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ambiguous, the trial court erred by applying the wrong case law. The Divorce Decree is 
interpreted according to established rules of contract interpretation. Taylor v. Hansen, 
985 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1998) "When determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." (Id Quoting Ward v. 
Intermountan Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 364, 268 (Utah 1995) "To demonstrate 
ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable." (Id) Whether the 
Decree is ambiguous is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. No 
deference is given to the conclusions of the trial court. (Id) 
The trial court determined that the Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement, (hereinafter" Settlement Agreement), The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (hereinafter "Findings" and "Conclusions" respectively) and the Decree of 
Divorce (hereinafter "Decree") comprised an integration, a complete and final agreement 
by the parties. It applied the holding in Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 866 
P.d 604 606 (Utah App. 1993) that unless an instrument appears ambiguous on its face, 
the court may not consider evidence outside of the four comers of the instrument. (AR 
617) Mr. Lether acknowledges in his brief pages 32 and 33 that Ward v. Intermountan 
Farmers Ass % and more recently Taylor v. Hansen, supra, require that all of the 
relevant evidence be considered when determining whether an instrument is ambiguous; 
and that the court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances. These cases 
essentially over rule the Hall case which precluded the admission or consideration of 
evidence outside of the instrument until after it was determined from its face that the 
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writing was ambiguous. 
The fact that several documents when read together constitute an integration 
should not make any difference in ruling on a question of ambiguity. When the court is 
trying to uncover the truth, why should it apply a more restrictive standard of 
considering die evidence to an integration, than it does when construing whether there is 
ambiguity in any other instrument? It does not make sense and poses a great danger of 
not discovering the truth at all. 
"[Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration 
of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties . . . so that 
the court can 'place itself in the same situation in which the parties found 
themselves at the time of contracting." Ward v. Intermountan Farmers Ass % 
supra, 907 P.2d. 264, 268, quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 69 Cal.Rptr. at 
565 
Paragraph 6 of the Amended Decree states: 
The Defendant should pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$1,000.00 per month payable by the 10th of each month. Defendant should 
receive $950 a month from the Birrell rental home until it is sold. When die 
Birrell rental home is sold Defendant should pay an additional $950.00 per 
month to Plaintiff for alimony. 
Plaintiffs alimony obligation to Defendant should cease on July 1, 
1996 and Plaintiff should waive alimony after July 1, 1996 and forever. 
( emphasis added) 
Paragraph 6 of the Amended Conclusions is identical. SECTION VI, ALIMONY 
of the Settlement Agreement also has identical wording. 
There is ambiguity in the alimony provisions and terms of the various documents 
is evident on the face of diem. The Court should have recognized that the switching of 
die terms '"plaintiff' and "defendant" which admittedly happened in the last sentence of 
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the alimony provisions of paragraph 6, rendered the whole provision ambiguous. (AR 
253) Only one sentence separates that provision from the critical provision which states 
the defendant should receive the rent. Even on the principle of construction announced 
and followed by it, the court should have recognized that Mrs. Lether's position was 
tenable and considered parole evidence to determine what the parties intended at the 
time they entered into the Settlement Agreement. However, under the more liberal 
construction of Ward v. Intermountan Farmers Ass'n and Taylor v. Hansen, supra, the 
court should have considered parole evidence to determine if there was an ambiguity. 
Under either rule the trial court erred in applying the law to construing or interpreting 
the Decree. 
Prior to the entry of the divorce, Mr. Lether collected the $950.00 monthly rental 
from the Birrell rental home. The Decree awarded the Birrell rental home to Mrs. Lether 
After the entry of the divorce, Mr. Lether ceased to collect the rent and Mrs. Lether 
collected and used it for her support in lieu of alimony. (AR 416) This continued for 
over 18 months, from August 1994 until the rental home was sold on January 31, 19%. 
Mr. Lether never claimed he was entitled to the rent in that entire period of time and not 
until July 17, 19%, after Mrs. Lether filed a motion for order to show cause why he 
should not increase her alimony by $950.00 a month as of January 19%. (AR 321, 326) 
Mr. Lether argues on page 29 of his brief that his being awarded the rent from the 
rental home was a quid pro quo for his paying the monthly payments on the first 
mortgages. He states that it is reasonable and logical that after the properties are sold 
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and he doesn't have to pay the first mortgages that he could pay Mrs. Lether the 
additional $950.00 a month alimony. However he never paid $3, 320.00 a month for 
Elizabeth's benefit as stated in his brief. Rather he paid the actual amount that he had 
not disclosed in the negotiations for interim support and which he could not then 
disclose in the setdement negotiations. It varied but was about $1,700 a month. (AR 
646-636, 749-744) For his failure to make the agreed and ordered payments the court 
granted Mrs. Lether judgment in the amount of $10, 694.74 plus interest. (AR 766-765) 
It is just as logical and more reasonable in light of die fact that the Decree 
awarded her the rental home, that she receive the rent until the properties are sold. At 
that time, when Mr. Lether no longer had to pay the first mortgage payments he could 
afford to make up the difference of $950 a month to maintain her interim support at 
$1,950 a month throughout the period that she was receiving support from him. That 
position gains added weight by the conduct of the parties for the 18 months to two years 
following the divorce when Mr. Lether stopped collecting the rent and allowed Mrs. 
Lether to collect and use it. 
Mr. Lether attempts to minimize the effect of the erroneous conclusion of the trial 
court by arguing that if it was error it was harmless error. He argues tiiat tiiis Court 
should not overturn the trial court merely for harmless error and that Mrs. Lether has die 
burden of showing that the judgment affected a substantial right and that, but for die 
error the result would have been different. And, of course, one can never show that die 
result would have actually have been different, but for the erroneous conclusion. All 
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that can be show is that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different. Mrs. Lether has made that showing. Mrs. Lether's Appeal Brief sets out 
several conflicting terms in the alimony provisions of the Decree and Findings, 
Conclusions and Setdement Agreement. It sets out a number of circumstances that do 
not comport with Mr. Lether being entitled to the rent after the divorce. All go to 
demonstrate that there is ambiguity in the Decree and that there was an of error in the 
provisions stating who would receive the rent as evidenced by die following facts: 
a. The Birrell property including die rental home was awarded exclusively to Mrs. 
Lether. (Decree, AR 293-94-Parcel 2) 
b. Mr. Lether collected the rent until the divorce. At tiiat time he stopped and 
Mrs. Lether who now owned the rental property began collecting the rent. (AR 414) 
c. Mr. Lether did not challenge Mrs. Lether's collecting of the rent as part of her 
alimony for nearly two years and then only after Mrs. Lether brought an order to show 
cause why he should not increase his alimony pursuant to the terms of die Decree. (AR 
326) 
d. Information sent to Mrs. Lether by the IRS indicated Mr. Lether refused to be 
responsible for the taxes on the rental income. (AR 591) 
e. Mr. Lether was paying Mrs. Lether $2,000 in interim support prior to the 
divorce. (AR 412-414) After the divorce he onlyu paid her $1,000 because of the rent. 
f. Mrs. Lether's divorce attorney, Jimi Mitsunaga provided an affidavit averring 
tiiat he understood she was to receive the same after the divorce and that his notes made 
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for the trial court's error in applying the law the result would have been different. Mrs 
Lether's substantial right was affected to the tune of over $20,000 which the trial court 
ordered her to pay over to Mr. Lether for the rent she had collected without his objection 
for over two years. Including interest thereon at the legal rate. The cases cited by Mr. 
Lether in support of his contentions that any error by the trial court was harmless and 
that Mrs. Lether has failed to show likelihood of a different result are inapposite. 
In determining who was entitled to the rent from the Birrell rental property, the 
trial court clearly applied the wrong law to determine whether those provisions in the 
Decree were ambiguous. Where the court applied the wrong law the decision should be 
reversed. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah. App. 1999) 
If the harmless error doctrine is applicable at all on an appeal from summary 
dismissal or judgment, the error here affected and prejudiced substantial rights of Mrs. 
Lether. The above outline of parole evidence proffered below shows there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different. The 
court's ruling on this issue should be reversed or in the alternative, die case should be 
remanded for the trial court to take parole evidence on the issue. 
D. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS TO PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF APPELLANTS CLAIM TO A SUBSTANTAIL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE DIVORCE IN RELATION 
TO HER CLAIM FOR ALIMONY 
The trial court erred in granting Summary judgment as to Mrs. Lether's claim that 
there was a substantial change in circumstances since die divorce and that she should be 
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D. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS TO PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF APPELLANTS CLAIM TO A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE DIVORCE IN RELATION 
TO HER CLAIM FOR ALIMONY 
The trial court erred in granting Summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Lether's 
claim that there was a substantial change in circumstances since the divorce and that she 
should be entitled to additional alimony. Mr. Lether argues that Mrs. Lether must show 
by a marshaling of the evidence that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
The trial judge found that Mrs. Lether's present physical condition and health was 
forseeable at the time of the divorce and that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
relating a change of circumstances since the divorce. (AR 1274) 
When ruling on Mr. Lether's Motion To Dismiss on January 29, 1997, the court 
stated thatH Elizabeth's petition to modify may proceed as to die effect of her broken 
wrist, the steady decline in her health and the deterioration of her bones . . ." (AR 614 & 
613) Although the problems with her wrist were new and there had been significant and 
new developments in the deterioration of her bones and a significant decline in her 
health the court found in its ruling on summary judgment on January 6, 1998, that all of 
her problems were exacerbations of the problems that existed at the time of the divorce. 
It found that there was no geniune issue as to the foreseeability of her present 
circumstances. The trial judge further stated that he believed the driving force behind 
her petition for additional alimony was Mrs. Lether's belief that the property settlement 
was unfair and that he was unwilling to open up the property distribution. 
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Mr. Lether argues that the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to any substantial change in Mrs. Lether physical condition and 
the deterioration of her health that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. He 
argues that Mrs. Lether must show that these findings are clearly erroneous and that to 
do so she must marshall all of the evidence for and against the findings. This he claims 
she has failed to do. 
However, Mr. Lether errs in his arguments. He asserts the law applying to the 
review by appellate courts of judgments issued after plenary trials. Those standards are 
not applicable to summary judgment. He cites no cases involving summary judgment 
asserting those standards of review. He cites Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
App. 1999), Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah. App. 1999) and Wells v. Wells, 
871 P.2d 1036, 1048 (Utah App. 1994) and argues that a determination that there has or 
has not been substantial change of circumstances is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
In Moon v. Moon the trial court refused to interpret the divorce decree at an order 
to show cause hearing. Later after a trial on the merits of die petition to modify the 
decree, the court considered the disputed evidence presented by both parties and entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court's conclusion that there was a substantial change of circumstances, but 
remanded the case for further consideration by applying the "Jones factors." The 
procedural circumstances and status of this case is nothing like Moon. 
In Wilde v. Wilde, the trial court dismissed a petition to modify alimony 
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provisions of a decree after trial. In doing so the trial court applied the extenuating 
circumstances requirements of the May 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 Utah Code 
Annotated. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment to the statute affected the 
substantial rights of the defendant and reversed and remanded because the trial court 
incorrectly applied die statute retroactively. In short it applied die wrong law just as did 
the trial court in the instant case. However, the Appeals Court's holdings relating to 
abuse of discretion are applicable to the determinations of the facts in that case after a 
trial of die issues. It is inapposite to the instant case, except in that case where the trial 
court incorrectly applied the law, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a 
correct application of the law. In that aspect Wilde supports Mrs. Lether's appeal in this 
case. Where the trial court incorrectiy applied the law in construing and interpreting the 
alimony provisions of the decree, Wilde supports her contention that this court should 
reverse the trial court and remand for it to apply the correct law. 
Wells v. Wells, also involves a ruling of a trial court after a hearing on die merits 
of the petition to modify. On Appeal the Court held the petitioner had not shown any 
abuse of die trial court's discretion in determining that there was no substantial change 
of circumstances warranting an increase in the permanent award of alimony. The 
petitioner was earning thee times what she had earned at the time of the divorce. 
However, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the denial of an award of 
temporary alimony because the trial court incorrectiy applied the law. At the time of 
moving for temporary alimony, the petitioner had experienced a loss of employment and 
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substantial hardship in meeting her obligations. Prior to the hearing on her petition to 
modify, she became employed again at an annual salary of about $36,000.00. 
These cases are not precident in this case where the trial court granted summary 
judgment on her alimony and fraud claims and dismissed summarily her claims that the 
alimony provisions of the decree were ambiguous.. To the contrary none of the very 
recent summary judgment cases cited earlier in this brief, supra, page 14, hold for or 
even mention the marshaling of evidence or of the requirement that the nonmoving party 
must show findings of fact by the trial court are clearly erroneous and that the 
nonmoving party show the trial court abused its discretion in determining there was no 
substantial change of circumstances. 
A determination by the district court that there is no material or substantial 
change of circumstances is a legal conclusion. In reviewing a grant or denial of 
summary judgment on appeal, this Court reviews for correctness, the district court's 
holding that there were no disputed issues of material fact and its application of the 
governing law. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company v. Manning, P.2d , 
376 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1999), citing Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah 
1995). In doing so this Court must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to Mrs. Lether. Only then if there are 
no disputed issues of material fact and Mr. Lether is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, may the decision of the district court be affirmed. Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 
UT 0042182, 378 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah (1999); accord, Pasquin v. Pasquin, 999 
14 
UT 0042186 376 Utah Adv Rep. 19, 20 (Utah App. 1999); Hall V. NACM 
Intermountan, Inc., et a!., 1999 UT 0042199, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah 1999); 
Salt Lake County Commission, et al V. Short, 985 P.2d 899, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 
(Utah 1999): Timm, et al v. Dewsnup. et aly 1999 UT 0042227, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19, 22 (Utah 1999) (directed verdict) 
In opposition to Mr. Lether's motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Lether 
presented by affidavit, a letter and die clinical records of one of her medical 
practitioners, Dr. Michael Callahan, concerning the deterioration of her health since the 
divorce. She also submitted the affidavit of Dr. Thomas Rogers who treated her feet. 
She has submitted her financial records (ledgers) showing a large increase in her 
medical expenses including her monthly prescriptions. (Appeal Brief. Pp 35-40; AR 
861 & 885 -877) 
The trial judge, after initially ruling that she could proceed on her petition as to 
the physical injury to her wrist, which was new and as to die deterioration of her bones 
and of the conditions that existed at the time of the divorce to the extent they have 
worsened, adopted the argument of Mr. Lether that her present physical condition was 
foreseeable at die time of the divorce and that there has been no substantial 
unforeseeable change in her health or her ability to be employed. 
In reaching these conclusions, the trial judge has acknowledged that he was 
influenced by a belief that Mrs. Lether is motivated by her belief that she was treated 
unfairly in the property settlement at the time of the divorce. While Mrs. Lether has 
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expressed a belief that Mr. Lether misrepresented the value of the assets in the marital 
estate, her expressions were raised and overemphasized by Mr. Lether at every 
opportunity in the proceedings below and are in this appeal. Further, whether Mrs. 
Lether believes she was unfairly disadvantaged in the property settlement is irrelevant. 
As opposed to the marshaling of all of the evidence, the only relevant 
consideration is whether she has presented sufficient evidence to raise a disputed issue 
of material fact as to whether there has been a substantial change in her circumstances 
since the divorce which may warrant an additional award of alimony. If she has 
presented sufficient facts to raise such a dispute, the decision of the trial court must be 
overturned and the case remanded for trial or an evidentiary hearing on the issues(s). 
Boice v. Marble, supra, page 4, 982 P.2d 565, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1999) 
There is more than sufficient evidence presented to raise a genuine dispute as to 
one or more issues of material fact. It was not until after the divorce was granted, July 5, 
1994, that Dr. Callahan examined her knees, August 24, 1994, and determined that she 
would likely need a total right knee replacement. (AR 243) He noted that she had injured 
her left knee in a recent twisting accident, but did not indicate when it happened. He 
recommended a total knee replacement of her right knee and indicated he considered 
treating the left knee by orthroscopic clean out and debridement, which would be a 
temporizing measure. He saw Mrs. Lether on January 25, 1995 and recommended a 
replacement of the left knee. Mrs. Lether's right knee was replaced on May 17,. 1995. 
(AR 881 & a79- 877). Dr Callahan saw Mrs. Lether for follow-up on Jun 9, July 14 
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and September 8, 1995. Her last two visits indicated improvement and in the September 
visit he stated: "She is doing really quite well and she is pleased with the results at this 
point. She has full extension and flexion to about 100 to 105 degrees and her pain is 
materially improved." (AR882) 
On August 2, 19%, over two years after the divorce and one year after its 
replacement, Dr. Callahan diagnosed more problems with her right knee and for the first 
time her right ankle. He also diagnosed problems for the first time with her left wrist 
from a fall about a year and a half previously. (Apparently this occurred about 6 
months after the divorce.) On May 2, 1997 Dr. Callahan noted that x-rays of her left 
knee showed severe progressive degenerative arthritus. He noted deformities developing 
in her right knee and that she would need some revision of the right knee at a fairly early 
date. He noted significant deformity in her left foot which included some cross over of 
her toes and a large bunion. (AR 884) This was a totally new development since the 
divorce. 
Dr. Thomas G. Rogers, in July 1997, provided an affidavit in which he averred he 
had operated cm Mrs Lether's right foot in 1992 and that it showed improvement for a 
couple of years. He stated it appeared that it would not give her any more trouble other 
than for normal aging. He stated, however, that it had deteriorated considerably in die 
past two years and that she would need additional corrective surgery and, in addition, 
corrective surgery on her left foot. (AR860) 
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It appears clear from the above medical evaluations that Mrs. Lether's medical 
practitioners did not forsee the extent to which her bones would detriorate and the 
additional problems that would arise even after corrective surgery since the divorce. 
Viewing the evidence from them together with all reaonable inferences that may be 
drawn, in a light most favorable to her, raises a disputed and genuine issue as to the 
material fact concerning a deterioration of her health unforseen by her and her doctors at 
the time of the divorce.. Her addition to these, the changes in her financial 
circumstances and her doctors* concern that she could not do some work and may not be 
able to work again, give rise to genuine issue of fact of a substantial change in her health 
and her ability to work at all. Her unforeseen increase in her medical expenses and a 
significant deterioration in her financial circumstances would not accomodate her living 
in a manner any where near that to which she was accustomed duaring die marriage. 
There is an ample showing to raise one or more genuine issues of fact and Mrs. 
Lether urges the Court to reverse die summary judgment of the trial court and remand 
the case for a fair hearing of evidence on the issues of her health, her ability to be 
employed and her financial circumstances since the divorce. 
E. MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE VALUES OF ASSETS 
AND OTHER MISREPRESENTATIONS BY MR. LETHER 
WARRANT RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY 
Mr. Lether argued below, and the trial court held, that the parties agreed to accept 
the values given to the marital property in order to reach a final setdement of die marital 
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estate. Indeed they did. But a settlement by agreement necessarily requires a meeting 
of the minds which in turn depends on a fair and honest disclosure of the terms and 
circumstances by both parties. Mrs. Lether has pointed out from documentary evidence 
which she discovered after the divorce, that Mr. Lether misrepresented the value of 
some of the items of personal property awarded to her by as much as double their value. 
She pointed out other instances where he misrepresented (over-represented by twice) 
the amounts of the monthly payments of the mortgages on the property in Utah County 
ultimately awarded to her. He did so at a time when he was negotiating to the amount 
he would have to pay to her for interim support. His misrepresentation diminished the 
amount of support that it appeared he could pay to her. 
In the Decree, he was ordered to continue those payments for two years or until 
the property was sold. However, unknown to anyone else, he paid only the amount of 
the actual monthly payments notwithstanding the terms of the Decree or the fact that he 
had agreed to those amounts in the Property settlement Agreement. It required an order 
of the rial court to force him to reimburse Mrs. Lether for the amount he had 
shortchanged her on the payment of the mortgages after the divorce. 
Should a party be excused from engaging in such deceit to his adavantage because 
he has deceptively convinced the other party that they should settle on the values he has 
stated in order to reach a resolution? Should a person get a stay out of jail pass, or as in 
this case, a shield from liability and responsibility pass, because he has been deceptively 
clever in his negotiation for settlement and because the other party trusted him and relied 
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upon his rejM'esentations? Does finality of an action require that result? The remedy for 
fraud or mistake in the inducement of the formation of a contract is at the option of the 
injured party, a recission or damages. 
The Court should oveturn the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Lether9s claims of 
misrepresstnation and remand for the taking of evidence on the issue of whether there 
were material and knowing misrepresentations of the values of the property by Mr. 
Lether. 
F. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND MR. LETHER IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Mr. Lether claims that he should be awarded attorny's fees for having to defend 
against a frivolous appeal. "... [A] frivolous appeal is one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
or reverse existing law." Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(b); Gildea v. Guardian 
Title Company, 970 P.2d 1265, 357 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 10 (1998) 
In citing Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1998), Mr. Lether 
acknowledges that attorney's fees are awarded in an appeal only where the appeal is 
frivolous and then only in agregious cases. This appeal is far from being so lacking in 
merit that it warrants an award of attorney's fees to the appellee. It has considerable 
merit. It is grounded in fact and in law as is set forth above and in Mrs. Lether 's main 
appeal brief. Mr. Lether's motion for attorney's fees should be denied. 
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n. CONCLUSION 
The trial court incorrectly applied the wrong law in determining that the alimony 
provisions of die Divorce Decree were unambiguous. Several factors including the 
conduct of Ae parties after the divorce indicated that all believed Mrs. Lether was 
entitled to collect the rent on the Birrell rental home as hers or in lieu of the same 
amount being paid as additional alimony by Mr. Lether. The trial court's holding should 
be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing considering all of the evidence 
available to determine the intention of the parties. 
When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to her, there is at least a 
genuine dispute as to one or more material facts as to whether Mrs. Lether has 
experienced a substantial change of circumstances since the divorce which may warrant 
an additional award of alimony. 
The provision in the Decree stating that both parties dispute the values given the 
marital property, but for die purposes of a final settlement, both parties accept those 
values, should not be held to shield Mr. Lether against knowing and intentional 
deception in overstating values of the property. The trial court's dismissal of Mrs. 
Lether's petition to reconsider the award of property should not have been dismissed 
without die taking of evidence to determine if her assertions had merit. The Court's 
dismissal should be overturned and the issue remanded for the taking of evidence at least 
to determine conclusively whether he did over value property awarded to Mrs. Lether 
and undervalue property awarded to himself. If so further evidence of die value and the 
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fairness of the property distribution should be taken. 
Finally, this appeal is not fiivolous. It is grounded in fact and law or a good faith 
argument fort the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. This Court should 
deny Mr. Lether's Motion for Attorneys' fees for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted thifr/7^day of December, 1999. 
Oral argument. Is requested! 
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